Choosing freely: the Friedmans' influence on economic and social policy by Allan H. Meltzer
191
Choosing Freely:
The Friedmans’ Influence 
on Economic and Social Policy
Allan H. Meltzer
t Milton Friedman’s sixtieth birthday conference, in 1972, George Stigler,
the dinner speaker and Milton’s friend and colleague, discussed econo-
mists’ or academics’ influence, particularly Milton Friedman’s influence. As
I recall the lecture after more than thirty years, Stigler began by noting that Mil-
ton Friedman was among the most influential of all economists. Then he asked
how influential that might be. The implicit answer was that maximizing indi-
viduals recognized their self-interest and acted accordingly. There was limited
room for influence or persuasion. Influence had, at most, the modest role of
hastening the adoption of better solutions.
To bolster his argument, Stigler chose the role of economists in repealing
the British Corn Laws. With his typical irony, he drove home the point: “How
heartening a tale! Economists turned a great nation from error to truth, from
inefficiency to maximum output” (Stigler 1975, as quoted in Schwartz, 1993,
207). Stigler then gave his own explanation of the repeal of the Corn Laws.
Economists’ defense of free trade had a modest role.
I found this argument unpersuasive and, in fact, more than a little strange.
It was made by an academic, a person whose life was devoted to teaching and
research. These activities are useful only if there are ideas that are not known
to students or not yet discovered or facts that are misperceived or misinter-
preted. It was written by a superb essayist who spent much of his life trying to
persuade, even influence, others. And it was based on a model of the political
process that denigrated the role of ideas, particularly new ideas, in political cam-
paigns.
Stigler’s comments went unchallenged for two decades. On Milton Fried-
man’s eightieth birthday, Anna Schwartz took the other side. She argued that
Stigler’s alternative explanation of the repeal of the Corn Laws was not com-
pelling. She went on to cite some examples of Friedman’s influence: the volun-
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teer army, education vouchers, and repeal of interest rate ceilings. But she also
cited some examples where his proposals had not been adopted; minimum
wage laws and import quotas are two examples. Schwartz also included a flat-
rate income tax with no deductions. Since that time, the U.S. tax schedule has
become flatter, and the Russians and some other former communist countries
have adopted a flat-rate income tax.
Not only is influence now an established theme when we celebrate the
contributions the Friedmans have made alone and together, but I believe there
is more to be said about influence. The Friedmans’ efforts to change major
aspects of society represented by Free to Choose, Capitalism and Freedom and
many other works contain numerous suggestions and proposals that were
adopted, some that were adopted in part or in modified form, and some that
remain dormant and rarely discussed. I will suggest some reasons for these suc-
cesses and failures.
Further, though I disagree with the main thrust of George Stigler’s com-
ments about influence, he raises an important question. In his terms, if econo-
mists convinced the British to repeal the Corn Laws and move decisively toward
free trade, why did the same logic not persuade other governments at the time
or in the next century? Why did it take seventy years for Adam Smith’s argument
about the benefits of free trade to be accepted in Britain? Stigler suggested that
external conditions, particularly demographics, were the dominant influence.
More generally, how important are external conditions, and how do they inter-
act with the ideas of economists, social scientists, or reformers?
One of the benefits of writing this paper was that, to prepare it, I reread
both Capitalism and Freedom and Free to Choose. These books are, in different
ways, rich in proposals for changes that increase liberty and opportunity and
suggestions about why some proposals might not be adopted. The main reasons
given for expecting proposals to fail are bureaucratic inertia and myopia.
Although there are references to theories of public choice, the authors mostly
do not emphasize rational, maximizing public officials. An exception is the dis-
cussion of drug licensing (Friedman and Friedman 1980, 209).
The Friedmans conclude Free to Choose with a chapter that has a hopeful
and even optimistic title: “The Tide Is Turning,” a declarative statement, not a
question. I will do the same, concluding by offering some thoughts on that sub-
ject twenty-five years after the publication of their book.
THE CLIMATE OF OPINION
Anyone under sixty years old may find it difficult to appreciate what the
climate of opinion was in the 1930s and how much it has changed both within
the economics profession and without. The dominant view then was that capi-
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how extensive it should be. Keynes wanted free markets for consumer goods
but state planning and direction of investment. Alvin Hansen claimed that mar-
ket economies faced stagnation, unless the state managed investment to main-
tain full employment. There were opposing views. Schumpeter (1942) dismissed
Hansen’s argument about stagnation, but he, too, for very different reasons, saw
socialism as the future.
Microeconomists discussed the “wastes of competition,” for example, two
or three milk companies delivering milk to the same streets. Planning could
deliver the milk and avoid the waste. Oxford studies showed that businessmen
never considered interest rates when making investments. Prices had little to do
with resource allocation. George Stigler mocked these early econometric stud-
ies, offering Stigler’s law: All demand curves are price inelastic.
Price theory was taught as mainly an exercise in applied geometry or, for
the more advanced, algebra. Economic textbooks of that period, and even much
later, offered few applications to problems. Agriculture was the exception. Price
theory could show the effects of agricultural price supports. More adventurous
authors used price theory to show the incidence of taxes. There was little dis-
cussion in economics of prices directing resource use or of crime, health care,
education, and many other topics that are the daily concerns of modern econ-
omists. The marginal productivity theory of labor was taught but dismissed as
lacking empirical content, an empty box.
In recalling that era, I don’t think I have exaggerated. As always, there
were exceptions, just as there are now Marxists, neo-Marxists and socialists of
various types in economics departments teaching something other than price
theory and its applications.
To me, personally, Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom came as a shock. Later
came Capitalism and Freedom, a book that presented as its major theme that
the “organization of the bulk of economic activity through private enterprise
operating in a free market promotes economic welfare and political freedom”
(Friedman 1962, 4). By that time, I was a practicing economist and, partly under
the influence of Armen Alchian and Karl Brunner, had given up my earlier leftist
orientation. The numerous, creative applications in Capitalism and Freedom
were then, as they are now, a treat to read and think about.
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
The Friedmans, Milton especially, have had an enormous influence not
only on economists and the academic profession but on policies in the United
States and large parts of the world. Their efforts to induce societies to foster lib-
erty, individual initiative, and freedom to choose and their successes have few
parallels. One thinks of Smith or Marx, both of whom are still read and whose
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course, there is Keynes the polemicist who wrote The Economic Consequences
of the Peace, the economist whose General Theory changed economic theory
and policy, and the social reformer whose Essays in Persuasion offered many
proposals for social and economic change. Whether we favor or oppose the rec-
ommendations, this is distinguished company. Each of these economists con-
tinues to influence policies and interpretations of events.
My Oxford dictionary lists several definitions of influence. The relevant
one refers to the power indirectly to affect the course of events. The only
change I would make is to insert “directly and” before indirectly, so that the def-
inition refers to direct and indirect influence on events. Friedman’s influence on
the military draft was direct. As I discuss below, he and others convinced the
military and other officials to try a volunteer army.
By my count, there are more than twenty-five specific recommendations
in Capitalism and Freedom, some additions, extensions, and repetitions in Free
to Choose, and other proposals scattered through Milton Friedman’s published
works. I find it useful to divide the proposals, first, into those to which the
Friedmans devoted considerable effort and those that received less of their
attention, perhaps because implementation seemed unlikely. Two caveats
apply. First, decisions about success and failure and about effort unavoidably
have a subjective element. Second, some of the proposals may have been
adopted in other countries. I offer some examples, but I do not have enough
knowledge of practices throughout the world to claim accuracy.
Failures
Here are some proposals that have not been adopted and, I believe, are
not currently under consideration. Each of these can be found in Capitalism
and Freedom. Friedman proposed to abolish state universities; abolish licensing
of doctors, lawyers, accountants, and other professions; eliminate agricultural
subsidies, minimum wage laws, right to work and fair employment practice
laws; and adopt a spending limitation amendment. In Free to Choose and else-
where, the Friedmans amplified the last proposal and, with others, developed a
proposed constitutional amendment to limit growth of government spending.
None of this has happened, and none of these proposals seems likely to
be adopted soon, if ever. Of course, the future is not knowable, but none of
these proposals is under active consideration currently. Some issues have
moved farther from free choice.
About fifteen or twenty years ago, more than thirty states approved a call
for a constitutional convention to adopt a spending limitation amendment to the
Constitution. The Constitution requires thirty-four states to adopt the call. I fol-
lowed the effort closely because one of our sons worked for the National Tax-
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responsibilities was to work with legislators to get the call for a convention
approved. The effort failed in the states with relatively more unionized work-
forces. The early successes may have benefited from some free riders—legisla-
tors who voted aye because the number of states remained below the constitu-
tional requirement. I count that as a failure.
In Free to Choose, the Friedmans proposed to phase out Old Age and Sur-
vivors Insurance (OASI). They would honor existing obligations, repeal the pay-
roll tax, and rely on voluntary decisions about pensions. They predicted that
their proposal “has no chance whatsoever of being enacted at present” (1980,
124). Stigler’s comment about demographics seems apposite. Recently, President
Bush proposed private management of a part of OASI accounts, a small but
important step in the direction the Friedmans proposed. The incentives for the
currently younger generation to seek to increase their return on pension assets
suggests that the “at present” in the quotation is more critical than at first
appears. The Friedmans’ proposal has not been adopted, and it seems unlikely
that the government will withdraw completely from managing pensions and
redistributing income intergenerationally. A partial success seems more likely
now than when they wrote.
Complete Successes
I count four complete successes—proposals that became law or policy
without major change from the Friedmans’ proposals. Three of the four are of
considerable importance. Each is a shift from command and control regulation
to free markets and free choice. The fourth success, the right of U.S. citizens to
own, buy, and sell gold, I regard as less important because there are many alter-
native assets and instruments. Fortunately, the time has never come when own-
ership of gold was needed here to protect wealth from a tyrant.
The three major successes are floating the dollar, ending the military draft,
and removing interest rate ceilings on demand and time deposits. The three
have in common that each change occurred in response to a crisis; the existing
system failed. In each case, there was at least one alternative solution that pre-
vented free choice in competition with the Friedmans’ proposals. One lesson
these experiences illustrate is that a market solution is not a government’s first
choice, or the obvious alternative in a crisis. Free market solutions have a
greater chance of success if the proposals are known in advance, proponents
have responded to criticisms and objections, and officials have become suffi-
ciently familiar with the proposal that they believe it can work.
Floating the Dollar. Floating the dollar in 1971 and 1973 illustrates these
principles. Milton Friedman first proposed floating exchange rates in the early
1950s. At the time and for many years, there was no interest among politicians.
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exchange rates would break down. By the 1960s others began to recognize that
the system was in trouble. The stock phrase at the time was that there were
three problems: liquidity, adjustment mechanisms, and confidence. Though
repeated endlessly, the main effort went to create additional liquidity, the SDR.
Governments and their officials solved a problem that did not exist and ignored
the overvaluation of the dollar. There were ample reserves of dollars available,
and the supply continued to grow. Except for France, foreign governments did
not wish to abandon the dollar or the fixed exchange rate system. They wanted
the United States to do the impossible—reduce the supply of dollars without
deflating or reducing U.S. imports. With the modest exceptions of Germany, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, and Austria, countries did not revalue their currencies,
and only France demanded devaluation of the dollar against gold.
A personal anecdote illustrates the state of informed discussion. Many
meetings and symposia on the dollar and the international monetary system
considered proposals for monetary reform. At one in the summer of 1968,
organized by Edward Bernstein and hosted by David Rockefeller, several aca-
demics met with prominent bankers and government officials. The agenda
included proposals for the SDR and return to a gold standard. Floating exchange
rates was not on the program.
Gottfried Haberler and I proposed to Bernstein that this should be added.
After some discussion with the hosts, he told us that floating exchange rates
were impractical but, as a concession, he would announce that those interested
in discussing floating rates could hold a separate session on the afternoon
reserved for tennis, golf, swimming, and other recreation. (Meetings of this kind
avoided shabby locations.) We declined.
This occurred after the Bretton Woods system had taken a major step
toward its demise. In March 1968, President Johnson had embargoed gold
exports except for central banks and discouraged central banks from asking for
gold. Three years later, the dollar floated, temporarily officials believed. Never-
theless, it floated—and experience with floating showed that it was not imprac-
tical or destabilizing. The attempt to fix exchange at new parities lasted less than
15 months. In March 1973, the dollar floated and, with the exception of a few
brief periods, the United States allowed it to float freely. The European Central
Bank also allows the euro to float. Of course, many other countries peg or inter-
vene. Since 1972, international reserves, mainly dollars, increased at an 8.5 per-
cent compound annual rate. At the end of 2002, two-thirds of the $1.8 trillion
in international reserves belonged to China, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and Hong
Kong.
Floating the dollar in 1971 was the most contentious issue when President
Nixon met with his advisers at Camp David in August 1971. Arthur Burns
opposed even after the president decided tentatively on including a floating rate
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the 15 percent surtax on imports, approved at that meeting, a permanent instead
of temporary part of the president’s program or imposing more so-called vol-
untary quotas on automobile, steel, and other imports.
Floating exchange rates increased freedom. Once the dollar floated per-
manently, the government removed capital controls that had been imposed in
the 1960s. Other countries followed. Early in the 1980s, Britain held its first elec-
tion without capital controls since 1936.
Ending the Military Draft. Milton Friedman was a proponent of an all-
volunteer army and served as a member of the Gates Commission, which voted
unanimously to recommend that President Nixon ask Congress to end the mili-
tary draft. The idea was not new. The United States had relied on a volunteer
army through much of its history. But relying on a volunteer army to fight a
large-scale war was new, and there were many skeptics.
Walter Oi (1998) explained that President Nixon discussed a volunteer
army during the 1968 election campaign. After the election Alan Wallis urged
Arthur Burns to discuss the issue with President-elect Nixon. Wallis got Bill
Mechling, Martin Bailey, Walter Oi and Harry Gilman to work out estimates of
the demand and supply schedules and to compute equilibrium wages. Fried-
man’s principal role was to explain and defend the proposal and respond to
questions. As a member of the Gates Commission, appointed by President
Nixon to consider alternatives to the military draft, he succeeded in getting the
military and members of Congress to see the benefits to them and the nation of
a volunteer army.
The war had become unpopular, and the draft had provoked riots, burn-
ing draft cards, and a spreading belief that the draft was unfair. An eligible
draftee could escape by going to college, fleeing to Canada, or having braces
put on his teeth. Ending the draft would be popular. The principal alternative
to the voluntary army, however, was a lottery. An eligible citizen would get the
privilege of serving his country if he lost—that is won—the lottery.
More than thirty years later, the volunteer army remains. A voice now and
again calls for a return of the military draft—usually based on an effort to share
the cost of war “equally,” whatever that might mean. These voices do not, as far
as I know, include senior military officers or presidents of either party.
Repealing Interest Rate Ceilings. Unlike the draft and floating exchange
rates, there was little controversy among economists about repeal of interest rate
ceilings. Those who wrote or spoke on that issue generally favored repeal of
ceilings on time deposit rates. Within the Federal Reserve, there was consider-
able sentiment, possibly a majority in the 1950s, in favor of making the ceiling
rate nonbinding (Meltzer 2003, Chapter 3). The members were reluctant to ask
Congress to repeal the legislation. Although several recognized that the ceilings
distorted allocation of financial assets, it was never exactly the right time to put
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a major reason, and there was no sign of crisis. By the mid-1960s, members of
the Federal Reserve acquiesced in or favored extension of ceiling rates to sav-
ings accounts at nonbank thrift institutions (Meltzer 2003, Chapter 4). The first
response was to extend controls, not ease them. A first constructive step in 1970
removed interest rate ceilings from negotiable certificates of deposit (CDs) of
$100,000 or more following the Penn Central failure.
It did not take long for entrepreneurs to recognize that fortunes could be
made by organizing mutual funds to buy large CDs and, for a fee, offering par-
ticipation to small depositors. The crisis came when the drain into these mutual
funds became relatively large. Banks and thrifts had to buy back their deposits
at interest rates well above the ceilings. This was particularly hard for mortgage
lenders when short-term rates remained above the long-term rates on their
mortgage portfolios. Elimination of ceilings had been widely discussed. Addi-
tional controls seemed unlikely to solve the problem. At best, they would post-
pone a permanent solution.
The three successes have in common that policymakers perceived that
there was a crisis. There was also a well-presented, market alternative that domi-
nated other available alternatives that offered less freedom to choose in markets.
There is some symmetry. There were no important crises affecting right to
work laws, state universities, licensing of doctors and lawyers, and many other
issues where the Friedmans proposed changes. A recent perceived crisis about
accounting processes and accountants led to increased regulation, but there was
no well-developed proposal to use markets and incentives in place of regula-
tion. Political response is most often the work of lawyers. Their training typi-
cally leads them to propose regulations—command and control schemes—
instead of aligning private and social interests by changing incentives when the
two diverge.
NON-CRISIS CHANGES
Many of the Friedmans’ proposals have been adopted in part without the
push from a major crisis. Crises provide an opportunity for governments to
make reforms, but reforms and changes occur at other times. Crises can create
the sufficient condition for ideas and persuasion to influence policy, but the
influence of ideas on policy occurs at other times. 
Tariffs have been reduced throughout the world. Reductions are rarely
unilateral, as the Friedmans urged, and trade agreements contain many protec-
tionist clauses. Deregulation of transport, banking, and telecommunications is
widely accepted as beneficial to consumers, but radio and television licensing
remains regulated by the Federal Communications Commission. The Treasury
offers inflation-indexed bonds, and it auctions long-term securities, as Friedman
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Reserve ended its so-called even keel policy of supplying reserves to hold money
market conditions constant when the Treasury marketed its debt. The even keel
policy often required the Federal Reserve to supply enough bank reserves to
ensure that the Treasury’s issues were sold. During the 1960s and 1970s,
reserves provided under even keel were a main source of excess money growth.
Education Vouchers. The Friedmans’ proposal to issue education vouch-
ers would increase parents’ freedom to choose the school they believe benefits
their children. Although many reports with titles such as “A Nation at Risk” use
the language of crisis, the public, and its elected representatives, have given
only modest support to Friedman-type vouchers. One reason is that until
recently the constitutionality of parents using vouchers in parochial schools had
not been decided. But vouchers and other methods that provide greater choice
and increase pressure for reform of ineffective schools have not produced dra-
matic improvements in learning, as measured by conventional testing proce-
dures. Further, proponents of vouchers would cite the intense opposition of
teachers unions as part of the explanation for the failure of vouchers to be
adopted widely.
I find the last argument incomplete. Interest groups did not prevent dereg-
ulation and increased choice in many areas. I do not question that teachers
unions oppose vouchers. Why are they successful when others are not? Why did
President Bush abandon a modest voucher proposal in his education bill?
I suggest that attitudes toward public goods and redistribution have an
important role. Evidence suggests that some families purchase better schools by
buying housing in districts known to have higher standards of educational
achievement. They pay indirectly for school choice, so they have strong incen-
tives to maintain their schools and much weaker incentives to improve schooling
and learning for others. Also, proposals to give vouchers to the lowest income
groups do not appeal to those just above the margin, especially if they pay full
tuition to the parochial schools where many of the vouchers would be used.
Emphasis on increased choice fostered change. Both the charter school
movement and home schooling have grown rapidly. In different ways, these
two programs have enhanced opportunities for individual initiative and innova-
tion in educational methods. The voucher proposal has encouraged choice and
change in ways the Friedmans did not propose.
Negative Income Tax. One of the Friedmans’ best-known proposals
called for replacing all welfare programs with a negative income tax. Below a
certain level of income, the tax authority would pay the citizen.
No government has replaced the welfare system with a negative income
tax. The proposal continues to stimulate research, and it has been adopted as a
supplement to existing welfare programs in various ways. The earned income
tax credit (EITC) is one familiar program that supplements earned income for
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There are three points to notice about EITC. First, it supplements programs
like food stamps, health care, and educational grants but does not replace them.
Second, it goes to people who have earned income and excludes those who do
not. Third, the transfer payment increases with the number of dependent chil-
dren, so it does not depend only on earnings. In 2000, 55 million people
received payments under the EITC (Moffitt 2003). The maximum income at
which a family received the transfer reached $32,000 in 2001, very close to
median income of black families.
As Moffitt (2003, 32) notes in his recent survey, the negative income tax
has ambiguous effects on labor supply and lacks a work requirement. Unlike
transfers to farmers and business firms, most welfare programs either offer trans-
fers in-kind or require work. Meltzer and Richard (1985) showed that a utility-
maximizing voter prefers to offer in-kind transfers rather than cash transfers
because the former induce more work by the recipients than do the latter. Pub-
lic discussion of welfare-to-work programs during welfare reform in the 1990s,
both in the United States and abroad, suggests that voters favor work require-
ments for all but the aged, infirm, and the most handicapped.
Again, on an issue involving substantial redistribution, the Friedmans’ pro-
posal influenced subsequent discussion but was not adopted in its entirety. The
Meltzer and Richard paper developed a condition under which a negative
income tax would replace in-kind transfers. The condition is that the pivotal or
median voter does not work. Fortunately, we are not there yet.
I agree with Moffitt (2003, 33), who concluded his survey by noting that “the
negative income tax has played a substantial role in reorienting the thinking of
policymakers to the basic message that incentives matter. While this insight does
not surprise academic economists, it is a new development in policy circles.”
MONETARY POLICY
Possibly the most famous Friedman proposal called for a rule for constant
monetary growth. Once again, Friedman’s proposal had a major influence on
subsequent developments but was not itself adopted. Several countries have an
inflation target for monetary policy but not an explicit monetary rule. Absence
of a consensus among economists is a major reason.
The history of money has a strong cyclical component. Periods in which
money is considered a principal determinant of inflation are followed by the
opposite—money is regarded as irrelevant for inflation or fluctuations in out-
put. Currently, the most widely used model has only one interest rate: a short-
term rate set by the central bank. Given that interest rate, aggregate demand and
a Phillips curve determine output and inflation. With the interest rate fixed, the
demand for money determines how much money the central bank supplies.
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fixed by the central bank to other asset prices and exchange rates in the short
run, before full adjustment of asset and output markets. Friedman’s (1956)
analysis of the demand for money included these asset prices as separate argu-
ments in the demand function. In his model, money can affect a wide spectrum
of asset prices and components of output in the short run, and, in turn, spend-
ing and the demand for money can be affected by those relative prices and
demands. Friedman’s money growth rule avoided the as-yet intractable problem
of predicting how the many relative prices or interest rates interact.
Discussion of monetary rules revived after the major inflation of the 1970s
and the publication of Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) paper on rules and dis-
cretion. That paper and subsequent work on credibility heightened and focused
central bankers’ concern for the public’s anticipations and beliefs. A monetary
rule or guide provided that information by increasing information about
intended future policy.
Several central banks have now adopted a rule called inflation targeting.
Many central banks calculate the interest rate consistent with their inflation and
output targets using a formula or rule proposed by Taylor (1993), although they
may not follow the rule. These limits on discretion are steps in the direction
Friedman proposed.
Friedman’s rule was a type of inflation control or inflation targeting. It dif-
fered from current inflation targeting rules not only by making money growth
the key variable for central bank control but also by defining inflation as the
maintained rate of price change. Friedman’s much-quoted dictum that inflation
is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon excludes one-time price
level changes. One should not doubt that Friedman understood that measured
changes in a published price index could result from changes in tariffs, excise
tax rates, exchange rates, oil shocks, productivity changes, and many other fac-
tors. His inflation rule permitted these price changes, positive and negative, to
remain. The reported price level would be a random walk, but the expected rate
of inflation would always be zero (or some constant value) if the maintained
growth rates of output and monetary velocity remained unchanged. Rational
individuals would make their consumption-saving decisions on this assumption.
The Friedman rule would avoid persistent inflation and deflation and the wealth
transfers they caused.
Current rules for inflation targeting treat all price level changes as inflation.
There is no distinction between permanent, or persistent, changes and transi-
tory, or one-time, price level changes. Following the constant inflation target
requires rolling up or back all one-time price changes. In practice, many cen-
tral banks will deviate from their target in the short run, if the target requires
loss of output. The reason is that the difference between potential and actual
output—the output gap—is an argument in economists’ statement of the cen-
tral banker’s (or the community’s) objective function.202 Allan H. Meltzer
HAS THE TIDE TURNED?
Writing in 1979–80 after the election of Margaret Thatcher, the Friedmans
were optimistic about a retreat from the increased role for government that had
characterized the previous fifty years in the United States and Great Britain. On
the back cover of the 1990 edition, they were almost exultant. They ended Free
to Choose this way (1980, 309–10):
Fortunately, we are waking up. We are again recognizing the dangers of an
over-governed society, coming to understand that good objectives can be
perverted by bad means, that reliance on the freedom of people to control
their own lives in accordance with their own values is the surest way to
achieve the full potential of a great society.
Would that it were so! The picture is much more mixed in the quarter cen-
tury since they first wrote. Tax rates have been reduced in the United States and
many other countries. Tariffs are lower, permitting trade to expand and living
standards to rise in many developing countries. Democratic choice of govern-
ment has spread to places where it had never been known. The former Soviet
Union collapsed, freeing many of its citizens and the citizens of its satellites to
choose capitalism and democracy. Countries everywhere have adopted some of
the Friedmans’ proposals in whole or part. For example, Russia has privatized
land and property, adopted a flat tax, and developed a pension system with less
redistribution than ours.
Against these promising reasons for hope, there are ample reasons for
concern. Most of the deregulation in the United States came before the Reagan
administration. Government programs in education, health care, and retirement
continue to expand. Even the current conservative administration promotes a
massive expansion of government involvement in health care. Measuring gov-
ernment size by the ratio of government transfer payments to gross domestic
product shows a rise from 4 percent during the Truman administration to
approximately 13 percent early in 2003. Figure 1 shows that periods of largest
growth occurred during the administrations of Presidents Eisenhower, Johnson,
Nixon, and the two Bushes. The Nixon years are especially notable. The trans-
fer ratio rose from about 6 percent to 9 percent. The administration did little to
stop or slow growth of the Great Society programs and even added its own
large program called revenue sharing. The few periods of relative decline in
transfers came during the Truman, Kennedy, Reagan, and Clinton administra-
tions. Relative decline can occur, of course, if GDP grows rapidly, as during the
Clinton administration, but that administration also reduced welfare payments
by reforming the welfare system.
Figure 1 does not include the proposed prescription drug program. Since
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creased regulation. Government intrusiveness is harder to measure than trans-
fers; I know of no quantification of the welfare cost of environmental, health,
product safety, and financial regulation. Some examples are instructive. Envi-
ronmental regulation of wetlands curtails property rights without paying com-
pensation. Price-setting for medical services distorts resource use, taxes specific
types of income, and transfers wealth arbitrarily. The list is long. Recently states’
attorneys general have added to the list using the courts instead of the legisla-
ture to regulate and penalize.
Governments at all levels have reversed their position on racial discrimi-
nation. Instead of enforcing segregation, as in the past, the law now enforces
desegregation. Freedom to choose surely increased as a result, but pressures for
mandating equal outcomes, not just equal opportunity, increased also.
Many of the changes away from freedom to choose toward increased reg-
ulation and more transfers are prompted by appeal to fairness or equity. Free to
Choose and Capitalism and Freedom have very little to say about fairness. Their
usual explanation of continued and enhanced regulation and redistribution is
either a version of “rational ignorance” or a powerful bureaucracy foisting its
will, or its clients’ will, on the public. The literature of political economy or pub-
lic choice is mentioned but not exploited.
I accept that rational ignorance applies to many details of tax or regula-
tory legislation and interpretation. Hardly anyone, including the legislators,
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reads the often hundreds of pages in many of these bills. Few would understand
the implications of many of the provisions for special interests, and much legis-
lation allows the bureaucracy to fill in the details and decide on the application.
I submit that rational ignorance fails as an explanation of the trends in
transfer payments or regulatory programs. Major spending programs for retire-
ment, health, and education do not require knowledge of details to know
whether one pays or receives. It does not take either much knowledge or much
experience to know that governments cannot produce health care, pensions, or
education. Production requires technical skills. Government provides inter- and
intragenerational redistribution of the cost. When the government announces a
major new program, such as the prescription drug program, those who benefit
and those who pay generally know which group they are in. Entrepreneurial
politicians understand that also. They recognize, for example, that the number
of those who bear the cost of old age pensions is growing relative to those who
benefit. It becomes feasible to discuss privatization for a small part of the pro-
gram.
The first concern politicians typically have about a proposal is not whether
it moves society toward a Pareto optimal allocation or increases efficiency. Their
first concern is who gains and who loses, who pays and especially who
receives. And that is what is most emphasized when they run for office. A Con-
gressman who points to the new health benefit or new highway he got for the
district doesn’t point out that there are 434 other districts that received the same
or possibly larger benefits.
By concentrating on the economic benefits and neglecting the political
system and its interaction with the economic system, Free to Choose concludes
on a more optimistic note than ex post judgment warrants. As de Tocqueville
recognized long ago, the political incentive to redistribute income remains
strong in democratic-capitalist systems. Votes are more equally distributed than
income; each adult has one vote. Even if we allow for those who do not vote,
the mass of the distribution of votes lies below the median earned income
(Meltzer and Richard 1981). Voters with incomes at the median or below gain
by transferring income to themselves. The efficiency loss to society from redis-
tribution is part of the cost of democratic government and political freedom.
The Friedmans swam against this strong current. They could not stop or
reverse it, but they influenced far more than most the ways in which people and
politicians think and act. They influenced the economics profession and other
scholars to analyze government programs and show their net costs. And they
taught a generation or more about the value to them of remaining free to
choose.Choosing Freely: The Friedmans’ Influence on Economic and Social Policy 205
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